BUILDING A COALITION FOR WORKERS' RIGHTS
AT KMART

Benjamin Henslert
Eight African-American ministers knelt in a Greensboro Kmart store
parking lot, flanked by police officers in riot gear and surrounded by a
crowd of local supporters. More than any other, this image, displayed on
the front page of the GreensboroNews and Record on December 18, 1995
with the headline "Clergy Arrested in Labor Protest," would define the
struggle of the workers at Kmart's Greensboro, North Carolina distribution
center, and capture its contradictions: a labor protest, but with prayer not
picket signs, and those in handcuffs not union leaders, but the pastors of the
city's leading Black churches.' As the police officers led the pastors away
to jail, the crowd sang "Victory Is Mine." This scene was repeated on
successive Sundays, with Kmart workers, church members and college
students all sharing in making this claim a reality.
The victory achieved by the distribution center's 550 workers and their
union, UNITE (Union of Needletrades, Industrial and Textile Employees),

and the pastors of the Greensboro Pulpit Forum, the city's AfricanAmerican ministerial association, has been viewed as a surprising harvest
of justice, reaped in spite of an unfriendly climate. It was a significant

success for organized labor in the least unionized state in the nation, and it
resulted in the signing of union contract by a $30 billion corporation that
had thwarted prior organizing attempts everywhere else in the country. In

broader terms, the Greensboro victory represented a successful joint
venture of the civil rights and labor movements during a period of difficult
times for both.3
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Yet if this victory is not to be merely savored, but repeated, it may be
useful to more closely examine that which produced this defining moment
in the Kmart parking lot. If these elements can be found in the Greensboro
story, then perhaps other communities may prove to be more promising
fields for justice as well.
As basic as it seems, it is worth recognizing that in any such struggle,
sheer courage is always a fundamental prerequisite. If a person such as
Rosa Parks had not sat down and said "I'm tired and I'm not moving," there
would have been no bus boycott in Montgomery. From the moment that
they began to form their union in the Spring of 1993, the workers at the
Kmart distribution center demonstrated that they too possessed the courage
necessary to effectuate change.
The landslide 249-132 vote in favor of union representation in the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) election in September, 1993only fifteen months after the distribution center opened-demonstrated the
employees' willingness to defy Kmart's aggressive opposition to
unionization.4 Yet where the courage of these workers would truly be
tested was in the fight to keep the union alive during the nearly three-year
struggle to win a union contract.'
While no single factor produced the extraordinary abundance of
commitment and leadership ability found among the union supporters in
Kmart's Greensboro workforce, there were several important ingredients.
Among North Carolina's urban centers, Greensboro is perhaps the one that
most closely resembles a northern industrial city, and at major employers
such as Lorillard Tobacco and Cone Mills, long-established unions can
point to some notable victories. When Kmart employees began considering
establishing a union in 1993, an employee whose relative worked at Cone
contacted the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union
(ACTWU, UNITE's predecessor union), which had recently led a three6
year fight to win $15 million for an E.S.O.P. pay-out for Cone employees.
As is often the case, one of the strongest factors motivating the
workers to organize was the behavior and policies of Kmart itself. When it
opened the distribution center, Kmart rightfully faced higher expectations
among its new workforce than would have a smaller home-grown firm.
The promise of stable employment and good benefits at a Fortune 500
employer? attracted self-confident men and women who possessed a clear
4. See Kmart Employees Claim Company Spied on Them, GREENSBORO NEws & REC.,
Sept. 15, 1993, at B4.
5. See generallyBarry Yeoman, No Ways Tired, SOUTHERN ExposuRE, Summer 1996,
at 15-20.
6. See Sheila Long, Employee Stock DisputeSettled, GREENSBORO NEws & REc., Feb.
27, 1993, at B6.
7. See Joyce M. Rosenberg, Top Five Hold Their Places on Fortune 500 List,
GREENSBORO Nnws & REc., Apr. 9, 1996, at El.
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sense of their own worth. Some had run their own businesses, others held
college degrees; still others had worked for years in skilled or salaried
positions. These were people who would not long tolerate second class
treatment or discrimination."
However, in their new jobs as Kmart associates, they soon found
themselves confronted with second-class citizenship.
Employees in
Greensboro were getting paid, on average, more than five dollars an hour
less than employees at a similar Kmart distribution center in Newnan,
Georgia.9 Also, the benefits in Greensboro were far less than at other
Kmart centers.1 0 Moreover, workers in Greensboro found themselves in a
work environment far less progressive than they had expected. The newly
hired workers encountered racial slurs and sexual harassment from
company supervisors, lack of adequate ventilation or bathrooms, and harsh
and arbitrary policies." All of these factors contributed to a growing sense
of frustration and disappointment.
The workers sought out a union whose own history had prepared it
well to take on this challenge. In the 1970s and 1980s, ACTWU's Southern
Region had developed a leadership and an internal culture that defined
itself in struggles like the one that faced the Kmart workers. It had taken
on and won years-long struggles at textile firms such as J.P. Stevens, where
the union had made up for what it lacked
in bargaining power with sheer
12
militancy, persistence, and creativity.
In its Southern battles, ACTWU had found inspiration in the traditions
and tactics of the civil rights movement. In its fight to organize the curtain
manufacturing plants of S. Lichtenburg and Co. in rural Georgia, where in
1988 the company illegally dismissed dozens of African-American
workers, ACTWU had succeeded in mobilizing strong support from
leading figures of the civil rights movement, including Benjamin Hooks,
Jesse Jackson, Joseph Lowery, and John Lewis.
It is hard to imagine that the workers at the Kmart distribution center,
or any group of employees no matter how courageous, could successfully
confront a multi-billion dollar corporation without the assistance and
backing they received from ACTWU, and later UNITE. Unions give
8. See Peter Krouse, Fight Larger Than Kmart Pay, Protesters Say, GREENSBORO
NEws & REc., Dec. 19, 1995, at Al [hereinafter Krouse, FightLarger].
9. See Mark Sutter, Union's Protest Threats Obscure Genuine Issue of Low Wages in
Triad, GREENSBORO NEWs & REC., Apr. 25, 1994.
10. See Mark Folk, Union Workers Rally, Say Kmart Pay is Low, GREENSBORO NEWS &
REc., May 25, 1995 ("Greensboro workers also say they receive 40 hours of paid sick leave
and personal time instead of the 80 hours at other Kmart Centers, and seven paid holidays
instead of 10.").
11. See Krouse, Lessons Learned,supra note 2.
12. See History of Unions in North Carolina, THE NEws & OBSERVER, Sept. 5, 1999,
availablein 1999 WL 2766874.
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workers access to financial resources, technical expertise, and institutional
relationships that make it possible to take on a giant corporation, all of
which were crucial to the Kmart workers' success.
Yet it is also doubtful that on their own, ACTWU and its members at
the Kmart distribution center could have won the victory that was achieved
in Greensboro. In September 1995, after over eighteen months of
negotiations between ACTWU and Kmart, the question of whether the
workers would ever secure a decent union contract was seriously in doubt.
The situation in Greensboro was shaping up as a casebook example of how
U.S. labor law fails to ensure workers' right to organize-even when it is
functioning at its best.
Despite a professionally run anti-union campaign that attempted to
intimidate workers into rejecting the union, the workers voted
overwhelmingly for union representation in September 1993.13 Unlike in
many other cases, the NLRB had certified the election results quickly and
directed Kmart to negotiate with the union. When Kmart fired union
activists, the NLRB investigated and issued complaints against the
company. 14 In 1994, when Kmart failed to reinstate the fired workers,
ACTWU held an unfair labor practice strike during
the week before
5
Thanksgiving, the distribution center's busiest period.
The Greensboro workers had used the tactics in labor's traditional
repertoire of the last fifty years-filing charges with the NLRB, striking,
picketing stores-but through the Summer of 1995, Kmart still was not
budging. 6 The company's strategy seemed clear: sit tight, wait out the
workers, and get rid of the union's activists, one-by-one. Yet, in July of the
following year, Kmart agreed to a collective bargaining agreement that
increased hourly wages for distribution center employees by up to thirtyfive percent, a result not often seen in even the most hospitable negotiating
environment. 17 What had caused Kmart's calculus to shift at the bargaining
table?
In part, what occurred was that a traditional labor-management dispute
was redefined as a struggle for civil rights-a moral issue with moral
resonance. The meaning of the conflict was transformed through the
emergence of a community coalition led by the pastors of the city's leading
African-American churches, and actively supported by a diverse alliance of
13. See Tammy Joyner, Some Kmart Workers Opt for Unions, THE DEMorr NEWs,
Sept. 14, 1993, availablein 1993 WL 6052709.
14. See Sheila Long, Kmart Is Subject of Labor Complaint Based on Workers' Charges,
GREENSBORO NEws & REC., Apr. 5, 1994.
15. See Scott Solomon, Kmart Dispute: Picketing Workers Back on Job Today,
GREENSBORO NEws & REc., Nov. 29, 1994.
16. See Folk, supra note 10.
17. See Kmart, Workers Reach Accord, THE NEws & OBSERVER, July 26, 1996,
available in 1996 WL 2889721.
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parishioners, trade unionists, students, and college faculty, both white and
African-American.
If the Kmart workers and ACTWU were fortunate to find each other,
they were also blessed to have as partners in this coalition the pastors of the
Greensboro Pulpit Forum whose moral authority and stature in the AfricanAmerican community were central to this redefinition of the workers'
cause. Unlike many other ministerial organizations, the Pulpit Forum was
not simply an opportunity for fellowship. Instead, it was viewed by its
leaders as an organization through which they could engage Greensboro's
powers-that-be around the issues and needs of their congregations and
community. Not content to bandage social wounds with counseling and
food pantries, the Pulpit Forum viewed the Kmart workers' struggle as an
opportunity to confront the lack of corporate accountability to their
community.
This leadership was in keeping not only with the great tradition of
social activism among African-American clergy in general, but also in their
churches' own roles in the history of Greensboro's black community.
Churches like Trinity AME Zion, the pastor and associate minister of
which, pastor Rev. Michael Frencher and Rev. T. Anthony Spearman, were
both arrested in civil disobedience protests during the Kmart struggle, had
been the site of mass-meetings throughout Greensboro's civil rights
movement of the 1960s.
As important as these activist traditions was the fact that the leaders of
the Pulpit Forum had among their ranks pastors who possessed not only
social prominence, but also solid organizing experience as well. Rev.
Nelson Johnson, a leader in the student movement at North Carolina A&T
in the late 1960s and a veteran of community organizing in the 1970s and
1980s, was one of the survivors of the attack by neo-Nazis and Klansmen
on a Greensboro anti-Klan rally that left five dead in 1979.18
Providing a balance to Rev. Johnson's reputation as a social activist
was the fact that the leadership of the Pulpit Forum also consisted of more
senior clergy, such as Rev. Benjamin Foust, as well as the pastors of some
of Greensboro's most prominent African-American congregations, such as
Baptist minister Rev. Gregory Headen. 19 Together, these pastors combined
moral authority and social credibility with activist politics and organizing
experience. Most important of all, they shared a desire and willingness to
employ their pulpits to raise awareness of issues of social injustice in their
community.2
A fellowship of pastors committed to confronting 'power and
18. See Krouse, Lessons Learned,supra note 2.

19. See icL
20. See id.; see also Lex Alexander, MinistersHear a Call to Speak Out, GREENSBORO
Naws & REC., Sept. 29, 1996, at El.
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principality,' a scrappy Southern textile union drawing confidence from
hard-fought victories, and a fearless cadre of worker activists: these were
the main components of the coalition which would confront Kmart in
Greensboro.2' The success of this alliance necessitated a commitment to
action, along with the coordination of partners who were not easily
understood by each other.
The coalition of the union and Pulpit Forum required the willingness
of each to modify its familiar modes of activism. For the pastors, this
meant watching community meetings take on the flavor of union rallies,
and for union organizers, watching picket lines take on the spirit of prayer
vigils. For each, it meant occasionally stepping back so that the other could
take the leading role, and understanding that certain messages and certain
venues required one to remain silent for the other to be heard.2 Accepting
this division of labor and developing the trust that it required was essential
to the coalition's success.
Yet if they were committed to helping the Kmart workers win, neither
pastors nor union organizers had much choice but to act in concert. The
pastors clearly recognized that any gains achieved by the Kmart workers
would have to be delivered at the bargaining table through negotiations
between Kmart and the union.2
It was also clear to the union's leaders that going alone would mean
having the struggle portrayed according to the traditional terms of labor
relations, in which the workers' fight against poverty wages, degrading
treatment, and retaliatory firings would be pigeon-holed into the category
of a "labor-management dispute." Allowing this would result in the
conflict being viewed, at best, as a threat to local economic growth, a
conflict in which the larger community had little at stake. In Greensboro,
where, as in so much of American society, the moral claims of workers
often go ignored, it was necessary to find different messengers and a
different message in order to be heard.24
When articulated by clergy, who by their very positions possess moral
authority, the social relevancy of the workers' struggle was much harder to
ignore. When the Kmart workers alone held a sit-in protest at the Kmartsponsored Greensboro Golf Open in 1994, they were dismissed in the local
press as making "fools of themselves" and "attacking the Greensboro
community."2' After the arrests of the pastors eighteen months later, the
21. See Diane E. Lewis, A Union of New Energy, Old Tactics Scrappy Product of Two
Old-Line Textile Unions: UNITE is Winning Battles and Raising Hackles, THE BOSTON
GLOBE, Oct. 20, 1996, at Fl.
22. See Alexander, supra note 20.
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. Union Lost Credibilityin Protestto Jaycees, GREENSBORO NEws & REC., Apr. 16,
1994, at A8.
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same newspaper ran a much more ambivalent editorial entitled "Kmart
Workers Test Objectivity of All."
The article suggested that the
involvement of the ministers
gave
the
workers'
demands a credibility that
26
could not easily be denied.
The issue of race also made it impossible to cast the conflict as "just a
labor dispute."
While African-American workers frequently called
attention to alleged incidents of racial discrimination, inside the distribution
center there was a strong tendency for union supporters, both white and
black, to downplay the struggle's racial aspects and unite their coworkers
around shared issues in the workplace. Yet, when it came to the way the
workers' struggle was viewed outside the facility, it was clear that racial
elements resonated most strongly in the broader commumity. 27
Race, rather than the "labor-management conflict," acted as a lens
through which the moral aspects of the struggle could be seen more clearly
and better understood by the community at large. African-American
workers who experienced discrimination at the distribution center lodged
complaints not only with the NLRB, charging Kmart with retaliation for
their union activities, but also with the E.E.O.C., accusing the company of
racial bias as well.2
Through extensive research, ACTWU established that not only was
the Greensboro distribution center the lowest paid of any Kmart facility of
its type, but also was the only one with a majority non-white workforce. 29
In April 1996, Kmart filed suit against a number of pastors and Kmart
workers for damaging business at its stores. In answering the company's
charges, the defendants noted that although many white workers and
ministers had participated in the boycott protests, the only defendants
named in the complaint were black clergy and employees.
Through the combination of these two elements-the public
leadership of African-American clergy and a focus on the moral issues at
stake in the conflict-the workers' fight with Kmart was transformed from
a simple labor dispute into a community-based struggle. Contributing to
this transformation were conscious moves by the union and the Pulpit
Forum to develop grassroots support for their efforts and to draw on the
Greensboro community's own traditions of struggle.3
The union and the Pulpit Forum did not seek endorsement from
26. See Kmart Workers Test the Objectivity ofAll, GREENSBORO NEws & REc., Dec. 19,
1995, at A10.
27. See Alexander, supranote 20; see also Krouse, FightLarger,supra note 8.
28. See Sheila Long, Kmart is Subject of Labor ComplaintBased on Workers' Charges,
GREENSBORO NEws & REc., Apr. 5, 1994, at B5; Kelly Simmons, Charges Filed in Kmart
660 Protest,GREENSBORO NEws & REC., Apr. 25, 1994, at A7.
29. See Krouse, Lessons Learned,supra note 2.
30. See Alexander, supranote 20.
31. See id
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national organizations like the AFL-CIO or NAACP leading up to their call
for a Christmas season boycott of Kmart in the fall of 1995. Instead, they
called only for a boycott of Kmart's six local stores in the Greensboro area,
and prior to announcing the boycott, collected over 10,000 signatures of
local residents on a petition to Kmart supporting the workers.3 2 As a
setting for the press conference announcing the boycott, they chose the
former Woolworth store that had been the site of the historic 1960 lunch
counter sit-in.
As the boycott progressed, the authenticity of this locally-rooted
effort, led by a group of pastors drawing on a community's own tradition of
struggle, drew attention to the struggle far beyond Greensboro. In March
1996, the campaign garnered coverage in publications as diverse as the Los
Angeles Times and Black Enterprisemagazine.33
Kmart feared that the images defining this local struggle, such as of
African-American pastors being arrested while praying in a Kmart parking
lot, were ones that would also strike a chord with customers outside of
Greensboro, and especially African-American consumers. This fear clearly
played a key role in the company's decision to reach a settlement with the
union. Kmart, like many retailers, understood the importance of its image,
and obviously had no desire to become the next Denny's or Texaco.
In their contract settlements with Kmart, the first in 1996 and then a
renewal in 1999, the Greensboro workers made gains which substantially
corrected the disparities in wages and benefits which had existed before
unionization. By the end of the current union contract, top pay for general
warehouse workers will be over twelve dollars per hour, an increase of
nearly fifty percent from 1996 levels. Workers have also achieved parity in
benefits with other Kmart distribution center employees, doubling their
yearly allowance of paid leave. Greensboro is the only Kmart distribution
center where employees enjoy Martin Luther King Day as a paid holiday.
Just as significant is the inspiration that the Greensboro workers'
victory has provided other Kmart employees around the country. In the last
two years, workers at two other Kmart distribution centers in Morrisville,
New Jersey and Warren, Ohio have organized with the United Auto
Workers (UAW). During both union campaigns, the UNITE local at the
Greensboro facility sent its president, Sullivan Hamlet, to meet with their
fellow Kmart workers and share the story of their struggle.
The Greensboro experience provides not just inspiration, but concrete
lessons as well. First is the recognition that because such battles are fought
32. See Meredith Barkley, Ministers May Boycott Area Kmarts, GREENSBORO NEWS &
REC., Nov. 15, 1995, at B4.
33. Mike Clary, Workers Say Kmart Short-Changing Them, Los ANGELES TIMEs, Mar.
31, 1996, at A23; Yana Ginburg, Kmart Boycott Spreads Nationally, BLACK ENTERPRISE,
July, 1996, at 17.
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out in the arena of public opinion, the framing of the struggle is essential to
the victory. Would the Kmart workers' fight be seen as a labormanagement dispute or a civil rights campaign? Would Kmart's practices
in Greensboro be viewed as providing jobs or perpetuating discrimination?
The outcome of the conflict often lies in its definition.
Second is to appreciate that coalitions work best by partnering
organizations whose strengths are complementary-such as the clergy with
its moral authority and the union with its experience-in confronting
corporate power. Seizing the potential of such a coalition requires a
willingness to reconsider usual ways of acting, and compromises are
necessary to bring the power of the church to the picket line and vice versa.
The resulting combination, in this case of strategic resources and public
credibility, can create power that is unavailable to either partner
individually.
Such coalitions are most authentic when the participants bring to them
their own traditions of struggle, such as the hard-fought history of southern
union organizing, and the heritage of Greensboro's home-grown civil rights
movement. For the Greensboro Kmart workers, claiming their victory
meant claiming both legacies as their own.

